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This paper aims to investigate the notion that development cooperation financing practices are 
undergoing a “Southernisation” - that is to say,  (re)emerging donors from the South like 
China, India or Brazil are influencing traditional donor practices and discourse. It aims to do 
so by means of an exploratory comparative analysis of European Union and Chinese 
development cooperation financing practices towards Latin America, and how they have 
evolved over the past decade (2007-2017). The paper finds that for this specific case study, 
the answer to this question is rather more nuanced than first expected. Firstly, although recent 
evolutions in EU’s discourse and practices in terms of development cooperation financing 
indicate a move towards the Southern model of development, at the same time China is 
moving quickly towards the traditional donor model with regards to certain issues including 
the use of conditionalities and environmental standards, among others. It thus would seem that 
whereas initial reactions by traditional donors indicated a definite move towards a 
“Southernisation” of development financing practices, lessons learnt by China over the past 
few decades have and are in some regards, reshaping their approach. Secondly, although EU 
development cooperation has become more focused on value for money, commercial interests 
and generally adapting to the new developing aid infrastructure, it is not clear whether this 
move comes as a direct result of the (re)emerging donor practices, or is rather being shaped by 
the current context taking place within its immediate neighbourhood. 
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Este artigo tem como objetivo investigar a perceção de que as práticas de financiamento da 
cooperação para o desenvolvimento estão a passar por uma “Southernisation” – querendo isto 
dizer que o (re) aparecimento de doadores do Sul, como a China, India ou Brasil, estão a 
influenciar o discurso e as práticas dos doadores tradicionais. O objetivo é efetuá-lo através de 
uma análise comparativa exploratória das práticas de financiamento da cooperação para o 
desenvolvimento da União Europeia e da China para a América Latina e a sua evolução 
durante a última década (2007-2017). O artigo conclui que, para este estudo de caso 
específico, a resposta a esta questão tem mais nuances do que o inicialmente esperado. Em 
primeiro lugar, apesar das recentes evoluções no discurso e práticas da UE em relação ao 
financiamento da cooperação para o desenvolvimento, indicando um movimento para o 
modelo de desenvolvimento do Sul, a China está, paralelamente, a adotar rapidamente o 
modelo tradicional de doadores no que diz respeito a algumas questões, tais como o uso de 
condições e padrões ambientais, entre outros. Compreende-se então que, enquanto as reações 
iniciais dos doadores tradicionais indicaram um movimento definitivo para uma 
"Southernisation" das práticas de financiamento do desenvolvimento, a estratégia adotada 
pela China, no que diz respeito às lições aprendidas, tem sido de reformular a sua abordagem. 
Em segundo lugar, apesar da cooperação para o desenvolvimento da UE se ter tornado mais 
focada no value for money, em interesses comerciais e, em geral, adaptando-se à nova 
estrutura da ajuda para o desenvolvimento, não é claro se este movimento ocorreu como 
resultado direto das práticas dos doadores (re) emergentes, ou se está a ser moldada pelo 
contexto atual da região vizinha. 
 
Palavras-chave: Financiamento da Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento, Southernisation, 
União Europeia, Cooperação Sul-Sul, China  
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I. Introduction 
 
The recent world context has coupled a long-standing economic crisis in Europe 
with the fast-paced growth of several developing countries from various continents, 
both in economic and political terms. These changing dynamics in the global order have 
called into question the foundations of a development cooperation approach whereby 
the “enlightened” North assists the “troubled” South. The latter can no longer be seen as 
a homogenous unit but rather needs to be viewed as the basis for the emergence of 
strong economic and political centres of power with differentiated interests and cultures 
– in many cases shaped as reactions to historical relations with the Western powers. The 
latter have come to realise that the “emerging” economies and donors are presenting 
other developing countries with an alternative development model and approach which 
goes Beyond Aid.  They see this new approach as undermining the developmental 
results they have worked so long and hard to achieve.  It can no longer really be 
described as “development aid” but rather as a mutually beneficial relationship between 
developing countries characterised by a respect for national sovereignty and interests. 
The threat to the established North-South development paradigm therefore transcends 
the field of Official Development Assistance (ODA), encroaching rapidly on the sphere 
of political and economic interests.  
This paper hopes to contribute to the Beyond Aid debate by comparing the 
development model of a traditional Western donor (the European Union), with that of 
one of the major (re)“emerging” donors (China) in Latin America over the period 2007-
2017. This timeframe includes the 2008 global financial crisis as well as the period from 
2010 when China’s presence in Latin America increased. The aim will be to discuss the 
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following question: Are we witnessing a “Southernisation” of development cooperation 
financing practices?  
It will be divided into three main chapters: The first two will provide a literature 
review of the Beyond Aid debate focusing on South-South Development Cooperation 
and development financing practices; Chapter IV will be divided into two main parts. 
The first will present Chinese foreign aid both in theory and applied to Latin America; 
and the second will outline European Union development cooperation policy in the 
same region. The following chapter will summarise the findings and compare the two 
development models discussing to what extent it can be argued that we are seeing a 
homogenisation of development practices, with a bias towards the “Southern” model. 
 
II. Making Sense of the Beyond Aid Debate 
 
2.1 Beyond Aid: A Historical Introduction  
Mawdesly, Savage, Kim (2013) describe recent evolutions in development 
cooperation taking as a starting point the late 1990’s, when after a brief hiatus in terms 
of aid flows from most Western donors following the dissolution of the USSR, a new 
“aid effectiveness agenda” emerged. The latter would concentrate on poverty-reduction 
and the promotion of good governance, and this would be achieved in practice through 
the achievement of the UN-led Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Two main 
elements would allow for this: greater recipient-country ownership and responsibility 
for their own poverty reduction and a global commitment to target-led results.  
The aid-effectiveness agenda was linked to a series of High Level forums (HLFs), 
which took place in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008), and more recently in 
Busan, South Korea (2011). Two major international agreements resulted from these 
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meetings: the Paris Declaration of 2005 “which promoted ownership, harmonization, 
alignment, results-based management and mutual accountability” (Ibid), and the Accra 
Agenda for Action (AAA) in 2008, which focused on improving predictability of aid 
flows, a greater focus on working through recipient country systems, and the untying of 
aid and reduction of conditionalities (ibid). Although these initiatives were widely 
welcomed and approved of, little progress was made in the areas highlighted by the 
international agreements. According to Douglas Alexander (2008), a generation after 
the Brandt Commission’s Report (1980) highlighting the need to tackle widespread 
poverty, “leading thinkers continue to grapple with many of the same problems faced.” 
 
2.1.1 The Failure of the Aid Effectiveness Agenda: External and Internal Pressures 
Some of the most relevant literature relating to the Beyond Aid debate summarizes 
the failures of the aid effectiveness paradigm as a result of external and internal 
pressures. According to Janus, Klingebiel and Paulo (2015), the external pressures 
include the global shifts in poverty that have taken the place over the past few two to 
three decades and in particular the growing heterogeneity of the “South”. Additionally, 
more and more recipient countries are becoming less dependent on aid with increases in 
national income leading to 28 developing countries with a total population of 2 billion, 
being crossed off the list of ODA-eligible countries (ibid). Another external pressure 
identified is the growing number of explicit goals being pursued with aid. Poverty 
reduction is no longer the sole objective and is now complemented by the variety of 
national and local level problems, global challenges (such as climate change) and the 
need to focus on public goods (such as security) (ibid). Mawdsley, Savage and Kim 
(2013) list two further (both internal and external) pressures confronting the Paris 
Agenda: firstly, the global financial crises have externally impacted development 
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funding and politics by enhancing the notion of “value for money”. Secondly, there has 
been a significant increase in the number and type of development partners, coupled 
with the growing influence exerted by actors from outside the aid arena (see also Janus, 
Klingebiel & Paulo, 2015). 
 According to Charles Gore (2013), in the past development cooperation and ODA 
were understood to be one and the same. There was general consensus around the 
definition of ODA as well as a coherent institutional set-up through which the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) oversaw the practices of donors and recipients. However, this architecture is 
rapidly evolving to give way to a more complex and diverse system characterized by 
multiple actors and differentiated approaches and objectives.  
 
2.2 Beyond Aid: SSC, Development Finance, Regulation and Knowledge   
Janus, Klingebiel and Paulo (2015) argue that the emerging form being taken on by 
development cooperation is severely fragmented and poorly coordinated, therefore 
creating difficulties in terms of the conceptual debate regarding Beyond Aid, which is 
still in early phases of development. It has become clear that the existing infrastructure 
needs to be reformed in order to respond to the emerging issues and pressures, but how 
this should be done is still very much up for debate. They proceed to outline the four 
dimensions that they consider make up Beyond Aid. 
The first relates to the proliferation of actors engaging in development cooperation 
and in particular the “emerging” southern donors that are creating partnerships between 
themselves – South- South Cooperation (SSC). Other new public and sub-national 
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actors are also seeing an increased role in development cooperation. The second 
dimension refers to development finance and a move beyond traditional aid financing 
through bilateral and multilateral donors to other sources and mechanisms of finance. 
Thirdly, regulation and policy coherence for development (PCD) is identified as an 
important dimension within the Beyond Aid debate, and finally, the fourth dimension 
relates to knowledge sharing and its close link to the transfer of financial resources 
(Janus, Klingebiel & Paulo, 2015). 
The next section will take a further look at the first and second dimensions 
described above: “emerging” donors and SSC, and changes that are taking place in 
terms of development financing. The aim of this section will be to lay further theoretical 
foundations for the ensuing case study comparing European Union and Chinese 
development finance practices. 
 
III. The (re) Emergence of South- South Development Cooperation 
 
3.1 Introducing SSC  
Since the 1990s, a group of “new” or “emerging” donors has been increasing its 
participation and importance within the development assistance architecture. This group 
of countries comprises “growing nations with strong economies that are increasing their 
international footprint through many channels including foreign assistance.” (Walz & 
Ramachandran, 2010). They ascribe to the principles of SSC, which simply put, refers 
to cooperation between developing countries (Bry, 2017).  
Although they are often referred to as “new” donors in the literature on 
development cooperation and ODA, it is largely accepted that the majority of these 
countries have been involved in development cooperation since the 1950’s and are in 
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fact merely “re-emerging”. The Bandung Conference which took place in 1955 resulted 
in the creation of the Non- Aligned Movement (NAM), the latter representing “the 
official beginning of a collective voice for the South” (Ramachandran & Walz, 2010). 
During the following decades, aid programs were implemented in support of the 
Bandung objectives, generally in the area of technical assistance and in most cases on a 
fairly ad-hoc basis. The 1980’s saw a decline in the number of aid programs due to the 
debt and oil crises, which forced countries to turn their attention inwards (ibid).  
However, by the end of the decade, development cooperation witnessed the re-
emergence of these donors as “dramatic economic growth in many “third world” 
countries proved a model for successful development that was not dependent on the 
West” (ibid). The increase in weight of these new players in development cooperation 
has been accompanied by a growing focus and need to define them and their practices in 
an attempt by traditional donors, to integrate them into the existing and evolving aid 
architecture. 
According to Walz and Ramachandran (2010), “the notion of emerging donors is 
relatively misleading as it lumps very distinct groups of non-DAC donors into one.” 
Several different groupings are made in the literature, but the one that seems to appear 
most consistently groups emerging donors into three distinct models (ibid), leaving out 
the new EU members: 1) The DAC model which bases its aid programs on the DAC and 
probably aims to join it at some point; 2) The Arab Model with the Arab donors who 
have been heavily involved in aid for some time now and which is very regionally 
concentrated and openly influenced by social solidarity and religious ties (Chandy & 
Kharas, 2011); and 3) the Southern Model, which includes Brazil, China, Egypt, India, 
Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela (ibid). These “donors” 
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(although they reject this term) insist on distinguishing their assistance programs from 
the DAC donors and the traditional donor-recipient model. According to Chandy and 
Kharas (2011), only this last category - the Southern Model - practices South-South 
Development Cooperation. Whether this distinction is made varies throughout the 
literature. The OECD simply separates into two categories: reporting
1
 and non-reporting 




3.2 SSC Narratives and Instruments  
Although “there are as many SSC approaches as there are southern countries 
involved in development cooperation” (Chandy & Kharas, 2011), Bry (2017) usefully 
groups together the SSC principles and approaches as described in the literature: 
Respect for sovereignty, no conditionality and non-Interference in domestic affairs (no 
governance conditions attached to projects); mutual benefits (commercial ties viewed as 
wholly acceptable in order for both countries to participate in development); demand-
driven ownership; horizontality; effectiveness and adaptability of technical cooperation 
and knowledge sharing (mainly in the infrastructure and productive sectors) and a 
regional focus.  
According to OECD figures (OECD, 2017a), ODA levels from countries “beyond 
the DAC” reached 25,2 USD billion from 19 reporting countries and 7.5 billion from 10 
non- reporting countries. The total flows from non-DAC providers made up 17,8% of 
estimated global development co-operation flows (ibid). This said, estimates in the 
literature vary widely and it is hard to definitively evaluate the extent of emerging donor 
contribution to development cooperation. On the one hand, reporting practices vary 
                                                        
1 Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Timor Leste, Turkey, United Arab Emirates. 
2 Brazil, Chile, People’s Republic of China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Mexico, Quatar, South Africa. 
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greatly, with some in keeping with the OECD definition while others are under-reported 
due to a lack of a standard system for reporting ODA, or of a definition of what 
qualifies as development assistance. On the other hand, the OECD-DAC definition of 
ODA is restrictive and does not take into account other flows, which South-South 
donors might consider to be development cooperation: 
 
“those flows to countries and territories on the DAC list of ODA Recipients and to 
multilateral development institutions which are: i) provided by official agencies 
including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; ii) each 
transaction of which is: a) administered with the promotion of the economic 
development and welfare of the developing countries as its main objective; b) 
concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent 
(calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent).” 
 OECD (2017b) 
Not all non-DAC donors report their ODA and among those that do, they do not 
always hold true to this definition making it very difficult to compare and analyse the 
extent, and impact of flows. 
 
3.3 The Changing Development Finance and Sectoral Landscape 
Until recently, the development finance landscape was very much dominated by 
traditional donors, with developing countries having little option but to depend for the 
most part on multilateral development banks and bilateral foreign aid in order to borrow 
(Mawdsley, 2012). With the rise of re-emerging donors, new financing opportunities 
have become available to developing countries and the importance of official ODA 
relative to other sources of financing is quickly eroding. This has strengthened the 
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negotiating power of developing countries vis-à-vis traditional donors (Prizzon, 
Greenhill & Mustapha, 2016). 
In the 2016 Overseas Development Institute (ODI) synthesis report (ibid), the 
importance of Beyond ODA Flows (BOFs) is highlighted. According to the authors, in 
2012 total external development finance to all developing countries amounted to $269 
billion, 45% ($120 billion) of which came in the form of BOFs. The latter was divided 
up mainly amongst Other Official Flows (OOFs) (37%): “defined as official sector 
transactions that do not meet official ODA criteria” (OECD, 2017c), bilateral DAC 
donors (23%), philanthropic assistance (22%) and (re)emerging donors (13%). 
Mawdsley (2012) outlines some of the main types of financing used by re-emerging 
donors: Exports credits (whereby either donor or private companies borrow funds on 
concessional terms in order to lower investment risk); debt relief (used as development 
cooperation and in some cases tied to trade or commercial interests); and technical 
cooperation (SSC cooperation is widely thought to be more horizontal, practical and 
experience-based experience compared to traditional ODA). However, according to the 
author, it is when analysing the use of loans (both concessional and non-concessional) 
by emerging donors, that the main conceptual and operational differences between them 
and traditional donors on ODA is understood. SSC donors use loans as part of foreign 
aid portfolios although they often do not conform to DAC definitions and approaches 
and oftentimes they have a high level of commercial intent but are still considered to be 
part of development cooperation relationships (ibid). Other characteristics of SSC 
development finance relate to: a bias towards infrastructure and production projects, 
whereas traditional donors have, since the 1990’s, prioritized social sectors; a 
preference for project over programme financing; speedier project negotiation, 
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agreement of contracts, project undertaking; and a willingness to fund high-profile 
buildings (ibid).  
According to Mawdsley (2012), two issues of contention, which cut across all 
forms of financing, relate to the tying of aid (mainly referring in this case, to the tying 
of aid to specific commodities/services to be procured (Jepma, 1991) and to the use of 
conditionalities. The former can take on different forms, often blurring the line between 
development and commercial- oriented interests. The DAC has been making great 
efforts to untie aid arguing that it undermines developmental and humanitarian 
effectiveness. However, according to Mawdsley (2012), a more cynical approach 
highlights the fact that tied aid can be seen as undermining fair competition between 
firms and creating greater competition within the financial services sector and that it is 
“for these reasons the mainstream aid and development community has aimed 
conceptually (if less so in practice) at separating aid out from commerce, sequestering it 
within a supposedly more virtuous realm” (Ibid). Chandy and Kharas (2011) add that 
SSC providers have openly linked aid to commercial objectives and mutual benefits 
whilst traditional donors do the same in a less obvious and opaque manner. 
With regards to the use of conditionalities, according to Mawdsley (2012), 
traditional donors argue that without them aid is more easily subject to elite capture or 
other forms of waste or distortion. Emerging donors are seen to be condoning human 
rights violations and jeopardizing their efforts in terms of good governance, with some 
going as far as to call it “rogue aid” (most notably Naim, 2007). However, according to 
an ECOSOC (2008) report, the majority of countries benefiting from southern 
assistance are also among the top ten recipients of aid from OECD/DAC donors. 
Emerging donors respond to the criticisms on their lack of interest in applying 
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conditionalities, by invoking the Bandung principle of non-interference in sovereign 
affairs.  
In sum, the main principles of SSCD along with some of the main development 
finance practices adopted by (re)emerging donors are the following:respect for 
sovereignty; no conditionalities and non-interference in domestic affairs; importance of 
mutual benefit approach (essentially the tying of aid to commercial interests); the 
importance of loans (both concessional and non-concessional) vis-à-vis grants and other 
forms of financing; a bias towards infrastructure and production projects; and speedier 
negotiation, agreement of contracts and project undertaking. This selection will guide 
the subsequent chapters and serve as a set of indicators in the final analysis and 
conclusions. 
 
IV. Comparing China and the European Union in Latin America: A 
Southernisation of Development Practices? 
The following case study aims to provide an initial exploratory analysis of EU 
(which subscribes to the DAC model of development) and Chinese (South-South) 
development cooperation to Latin America. In doing so, it will explore the 
aforementioned idea that SSC, and in particular the more “aggressive” approach 
adopted by China, is influencing traditional donor development financing practices, and 
that we are witnessing a merging of approaches from the two sides, with a significant 
bias towards the Southern model.   
Although the EU and China have markedly different approaches to development 
cooperation (both in terms of policies and instruments as well as ideologies and 
discourses - as will be presented in the subsequent chapters), both have only more 
recently, intensified relations in Latin America. In addition to this, both have been 
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adopting seemingly strategic approaches. Therefore, Latin America provides for an 
interesting case study as over the past decade it has witnessed significant changes in the 
development cooperation modalities being adopted by both actors: China has only 
recently become one of the main finance providers to the region and to some extent, its 
involvement in the region can be seen to characterize a more updated and, some might 
say, moderate approach by the Chinese government on issues such as the environment, 
types of financing instruments, main sectors of interest, and political motivations. On 
the other hand, over recent years, the EU has been signalling a move from a traditional 
cooperation model, towards a strengthened peer learning model (OECD, 2014) and an 
evolution in the terms of its engagement with the region can be seen. 
The next chapter will be divided into two main parts: The first will outline China’s 
involvement in Latin America and will consider the historical evolution of relations, the 
types of development finance instruments being used, and the main areas of contention 
as highlighted in the relevant literature. The second part will concentrate on the 
structure of EU’s development cooperation and how its approach has changed over the 
past period, and on its relations with Latin America both from a historical and current 
perspective. Following on from this chapter, this paper will carry out a brief 
comparative analysis of both approaches, based both on the set of SSC characteristics 
defined earlier on, as well as on more China and EU-specific issues. The overall aim 
will be to provide an initial insight into what a future Beyond Aid approach might look 
like, and whether it indeed signals a move towards a Southernisation of development 
cooperation financing practices. 
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4.1 China’s Aid to Latin America: Narratives, Instruments and Goals 
According to Creutzfeld (2017) as a result of its own historical path, China’s 
foreign policy is characterized by a few core issues namely, national sovereignty, social 
stability and steady consumption. These depend to a large extent on economic growth 
with guaranteed access to raw materials, food and energy. Thus, since 1978, the focus 
has been on a domestic modernization drive, which resonates in the Five Year Plans 
outlining a series of social and economic development initiatives. Further underpinning 
China’s foreign policy are the five principles of peaceful coexistence as proclaimed by 
Mao Zedong at the birth of the nation in 1949: mutual respect for territorial integrity 
and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in others’ internal affairs, equality 
and mutual benefit; peaceful coexistence.  
China’s record as (net) “donor” dates back to the rise of communism in China in 
the late 1940’s, and has experienced several different phases according to its domestic 
context. A more recent stage began in 1990’s when China’s economy started to grow 
rapidly, and aid levels rose again significantly after a period of concentrating it 
attentions on domestic issues. However this time, “in line with the new market 
economy, foreign aid was to be carried out on a business-like basis” (Stallings, 2017). 
As a result, Chinese aid is not strictly separated from other financial flows such as 
commercial loans and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Instead aid is seen “as one part 
and package of funds that promotes the development of recipient countries” (ibid). 
There is an allocation of “foreign aid” but it is seen as comprising one component 
within a larger concept of development cooperation (Mawdsley, 2015). China therefore 
tends not to make a strict distinction between development loans and investment. In 
addition, its aid allows Chinese companies’ increased access to energy resources and 
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favourable contracts, while recipient countries gain a new source of financing with little 
or no policy conditionalities attached to it – a situation that China describes as “win-
win” (Stallings, 2017). 
Compared to the EU, China provides low levels of “foreign aid” according to the 
OECD-DAC definition (refer to chapter III), which includes grants, interest-free loans 
and concessional loans. The OECD estimates that in 2015, China’s total ODA 
(according to OECD definition) amounted to 3.4 billion (OECD, 2017d), a low figure 
compared to the EU Institutions disbursement of 13.7 billion in ODA for the same year 
(OECD, 2017c). This said, the levels of financing going to other forms of assistance are 
significant and as Brautigam (2011) observes, the challenge posed by China on Western 
donors “has little to do with the Chinese tools that parallel those labelled ‘official 
development assistance’ by the West and far more to do with the many other 
instruments used by the Chinese states to promote its (…) engagement”.  
The majority of Chinese funding takes the form of soft loans (both commercial and 
concessional – with no grant element) and state-to-state investments in infrastructure 
and natural resources. Two policy banks provide the lion’s share of Chinese assistance: 
China EXIM Bank and the Chinese Development Bank (CDB). The CDB mainly 
supports Chinese macroeconomic policies as set out in the Five-Year-Plans, which 
focus on 8 main areas of development: electric power, road construction, railway, 
petroleum and petrochemical, coal, postal and telecommunications, agriculture and 
related industries, and public infrastructure (Gallagher & Irwin, 2016). The China 
EXIM Bank on the other hand, is dedicated to supporting China’s foreign trade, 
investment and international economic cooperation (The Export-Import Bank of China, 
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2017), and it does this through the use of export credits, loans to overseas construction 
and investment projects and concessional loans (Gallagher & Irwin, 2016). 
Most of the literature until recently concentrated on China-Latin America trade 
relations which intensified as from the early 2000s and which were easily observable 
due to comprehensive databases (Gallagher, Irwin & Koleski, 2012). On the other hand, 
China’s investment and lending to Latin America, has only significantly grown in 
importance over the past decade and China does not publish official reports and 
accounts on these figures. However, despite the lack of information regarding China’s 
assistance, the tentative figures indicate that its involvement in the region has rapidly 
outpaced that of the EU as well as that from other major sources of finance. 
 
4.1.2 Chinese Narratives and Goals towards Latin America 
Within the context of China’s foreign policy described above, Latin America has 
come to play a role in terms of natural resource diversification for China, as well as in 
advancing its “One-China” policy – nearly half of the countries that recognize Taiwan 
are in Latin America (Stallings, 2017). Since 2001, the intensifying of relations started 
off mainly as high-level leadership forums and state visits and later further intensified 
namely as a result of the 10
th
 Five Year Plan in 2008, which encouraged Chinese 
companies to expand their activities into three regions, including Latin America 
(Creutzfeld, 2017). Three policy papers were written in 2008, 2014 and 2016, outlining 
the terms of their bilateral approach to the region, always emphasizing the “win-win” 
nature of the relationship. Furthermore, over the years several attempts have been made 
at furthering multilateral cooperation, with the most notable being the creation of the 
China-CELAC forum, established in 2014. China is also member of the Inter-American 
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Development Bank (since January 2009), and has observer status in ALADI, CEPAL, 
The Latin American Parliament, the Pacific Alliance and OAS (Creutzfeld, 2017). 
Despite these efforts Chinese officials and businessmen have expressed their frustration 
at the diversity they have been confronted with among the countries and sub-regions, 
which have created obstacles to the interactions with the region as a whole. 
 
4.1.3 Chinese Development Finance to Latin America 
As previously mentioned, Chinese financing to Latin America is mainly in the form 
of large concessional and commercial loans. According to estimates put together by the 
China-Latin America Finance Database, in the year 2005, total Chinese public-sector 
lending amounted to $30 million and by 2010 it had already risen to $35.6 billion, 
overtaking the amount in loans provided by the World Bank, the International 
Development Bank and the US Exim Bank combined. Last year, after a few slower 
years (2011-2014), it rose again to $24.6 billion. According to Gallagher and Irwin 
(2016) since 2005, Chinese lending to the region has amounted to a total of $141.3 
billion, about 80 per cent of which have come from CDB and 10 per cent from the 
EXIM bank. The same authors, in their empirically-based research on China’s financing 
to Latin America, note that Chinese loans are large and concentrated among a few 
countries, namely Venezuela ($62.2B
3
), Brazil ($36.8B), Ecuador ($17.4B) and 
Argentina ($15.3B), which since 2005 have received 91% of total loan commitments. 
Other Latin American countries having received Chinese loans since 2005, although in 
significantly smaller proportions are: Bolivia ($3.5B), Mexico ($1B), Costa Rica 
($395M) and Peru ($50M).  
                                                        
3 Loan amounts from source: Gallagher & Myers, 2016.  
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The concentration of loans in countries such as Venezuela, Argentina and Ecuador 
that have had or still have restricted access to international capital markets has attracted 
attention from the international community claiming that China is undercutting Western 
efforts in terms of good governance. Additionally, the high risk taken by the Chinese 
government in lending to such governments has been questioned. David Dollar (2017) 
further investigates these claims and concludes that China is indifferent to governance 
levels and is merely filling a void that has been left by Western donors and IFIs. 
Whether this is a smart move by China’s government is unclear still – although the 
worsening situation in Venezuela will probably lead China to create stronger safeguards 
for its investments in the future.  
That being said, an important financing instrument is being used by China in order 
to reduce its risk: oil-backed loans or loans-for-oil. The latter involve an agreement 
whereby an oil exporting country receives a loan from the Chinese government, and in 
return a state-oil company pledges to export a certain amount of oil every day for the 
duration of the loan. The oil is then bought by Chinese companies at market prices, the 
proceeds of which go straight into an account owned by the policy bank that granted the 
loan. The bank then repays itself directly from the account (Gallagher, Irwin & Koleski, 
2012). In short, loans for oil “in addition to securing oil supplies, help (…) Chinese 
companies expand abroad, and build(…) relationships with South American 
governments…lower(ing) risk and increas(ing) profits” (Gallagher, Irwin & Koleski, 
2012). 
 
4.1.4 Chinese Sectoral Aid in Latin America 
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In addition to the focus on a few countries, as mentioned previously, Chinese loans 
target different sectors than do IFI and western loans – focusing on EMITH sectors: 
energy, mining, infrastructure, transportation and housing (ibid), whilst the latter focus 
more on social sectors in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Of the $141.3 billion loan disbursements, the China-Latin America Finance Database 
(Gallagher & Myers, 2016) estimates that over 70% went to infrastructure projects, 17% 
to energy sector projects, and 12% to mining and other sectors. According to Gallagher, 
Irwin and Koleski (2012), whether this sectorial focus signals a different development 
model, whereby China seeks to directly impact economic growth and create jobs in 
recipient countries, or it is merely seeking access to key natural resources and markets, 
is unclear. 
The infrastructure and extractive sectors inherently carry high risks in terms of the 
environment and the displacement of people (Dollar, 2017). China has a rather tarnished 
reputation in this respect, although it argues that instead of subscribing to international 
standards, it follows the domestic regulations, in keeping with the notion of non-
interference other country’s domestic affairs. However, as Dollar (2017) argues, 
countries with bad governance are often those with the weakest regulation and/or 
application of environmental safeguards. However, the same author argues that China 
has made important strides in this respect and that in fact although “multilateral banks 
have developed gold-plated standards, (…) they apply to only a fraction of investment” 
seeing as infrastructure and extractive sector investments account for a minimal amount 
of total spending to developing countries. In fact, this is not only due to multilateral 
banks own policy, but is also linked to the burdensome bureaucratic process that these 
Lauren Glanville         A Southernisation of Development Cooperation?                              19 
 
       19  
stringent environmental standards impose on recipient country institutions, encouraging 
the latter to turn to China for financing in these sectors. 
Another characteristic to be discussed in this section relates to the lack of policy 
conditionalities imposed by China on recipient or partner countries. This is in keeping 
with the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence, which underpin its foreign policy 
approach. The idea here is that countries negotiate on equal terms and recipient 
countries are not submitted to governance and economic conditions in order to receive 
development financing. Although China does not impose policy conditionalities, it 
imposes conditions relating to the purchase of Chinese goods or equipment with a part 
of the loan, and in some cases the entire loan. This is in keeping with the idea of a “win-
win” partnership and allows Chinese banks to lower the chances of default risk (Dollar, 
2017). Finally, concerns have been expressed with concerns to the growing dependence 
of the region’s economies on China as a result of what some refer to as the “biggest 
commodity lottery” (Wise, 2017). Total China-Latin America and Caribbean trade 
increased 22-fold during the period 2000-2013 and FDI increased exponentially 
especially to Brazil and Argentina with the most investment being made in resource 
extraction (ibid). Although this has had positive impacts especially when one looks at 
the capacity of these economies to rebound from the 2008-09 global financial crisis, on 
the other hand a large dependency has been created. Carol Wise (2017) argues however, 
that although these economies have been negatively affected by China’s slowdown, this 
dependence relationship is not specific to these relations, but is rather a case of path 
dependence, and thus the slowing down of the Chinese economy is once again 
highlighting institutional fragilities. 
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4.2 EU Aid to Latin America: Narratives, Instruments and Goals 
According to Mah (2013), the EU’s history as a development aid donor can be 
separated into three distinct historical phases. The first spanned from the 50’s to the mid 
80’s during which time development policy was guided by the Lomé Convention and 
was applicable merely to the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The 
signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which expanded development policy beyond 
the ACP countries to include all developing countries, marked the ensuing phase from 
the 1980’s to the late 1990’s. This period was strongly influenced by the Washington 
Consensus whereby economic conditions were prioritized over political ones in the 
disbursement of aid. The most recent phase can be said to have begun in the early 
2000’s with the Cotonou Agreement replacing and updating the Lomé Convention. The 
former has aimed to increase the role of recipient countries by making aid needs and 
performance-based. Additionally, the 2005 European Consensus on Development, 
which sets out common strategic norms for development cooperation, and the 2007 
Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour, were pivotal in 
increasing the complementarity and coordination within EU development cooperation 
efforts. Since 2009, the Lisbon Treaty has aimed to further reshape EU development 
policy by integrating it into the EU’s external action and by means of important internal 
organizational changes. 
Currently two main institutions are in charge of EU’s development policy: the new 
Directorate General for Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO) and the European 
External Action Service (EEAS). Additionally, the 2011 EU Agenda for Change to 
some extent replaced the 2005 European Consensus for Change as the basis for future 
EU development cooperation instruments. Most recently, at the beginning of 2017, the 
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EU Council, Commission and Parliament endorsed the New European Consensus for 
Development (NECD). The Agenda for Change for its part signalled a change of the 
development paradigm from a poverty-focused approach to an economic growth model 
(CONCORD, 2013), a change that was then reflected in the EU’s latest seven-year 
development cooperation plans. 
The EU’s political priorities are presented in financial terms within the Multiannual 
Financial Frameworks (MFF), which span a minimum period of 5 years. The latest 
MFF runs from 2014 to 2020 and allocates a total of around €95 billion to external 
relations (EC, 2017a). This budget is distributed amongst a series of instruments put in 
place by the EU to carry out its development policy: Instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance II (IPA II), European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), Development 
Cooperation Instrument (DCI), Instrument for Greenland (IfG), Partnership Instrument 
(PI), Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IfSP), European Instrument for 
Democracy & Human Rights (EIDHR), and the Instrument for Nuclear Safety and 
Cooperation (INSC) (see Figure 1 for descriptions and budget allocations for each of the 
instruments). The first 4 instruments listed above are geographic and the following 4 are 
thematically focused. Together, these instruments are covered by the EU budget. Aside 
from these instruments, € 30.5 billion was allocated to the 11th European Development 
Fund (EDF) that is not covered by the EU budget which covers cooperation in among 
others, Caribbean countries.  
In order for budgets allocated to each instrument to be disbursed to countries and/ 
or regions, Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) and Regional Strategy Papers (RSPs) are 
defined between the EEAS and recipient(s) which then act as the basis for multiannual 
cooperation programming with indicative funding per commitment and sector (Lima, 
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Herrera, Lebret & Echeverria, 2014). Development cooperation can be provided using 
two main implementation methods: budget support and project modality. The former is 
encouraged as a means of strengthening recipient country ownership, financing national 
development strategies and supporting more efficient and transparent public finance 
management. This modality is often linked to economic and political conditionalities 
with countries needing to achieve a series of results in order to continue benefiting from 
on-going support (ibid). Projects and programmes on the other hand, support recipient 
governments in the implementation of sector policy and improved service delivery 
(ibid). Although not strictly a programme implementation method, the EU Blending 
Facilities (which will be discussed further in the following section) are also now used in 
order to leverage additional resources for development financing. 
 
4.2.1 The Agenda for Change: What’s New? 
CONCORD (2013), the Confederation of EU Development NGO´s Platforms, in its 
working paper outlines the main trends of the 2011 Agenda for Change and how these 
were reflected in the 2014-2020 MFF. Some of these include: a greater move towards a 
“value for money” approach and concentration on fewer countries and fewer sectors; 
discussions about the definition of ODA with some Member States wanting to expand 
aid to include other costs, as well as concessional loans and other official flows (OOFs); 
promotion of economic development with increasing focus on private sector 
development; promotion of governance and stricter aid conditionalities; a reduction of 
direct support to social sectors; using GDP to determine the countries that should be 
benefitting from aid; the interests of donors becoming more visible; and the blending of 
public and private loans and grants. Some of these emerging trends are directly 
observable in some of the instruments and implementation mechanisms of external aid 
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present in the latest MFF (2014-2020). The next section will take a look at those having 
a direct impact on the EU’s development cooperation approach to Latin America. 
 
4.2.2 EU Narratives and Goals for Aid to Latin America  
According to Roy (2009), despite the longstanding links existing between the two 
regions, relations between the EU and Latin America did not really take off until the 
1980’s. This was mainly due to the initial objectives of the European Community, 
which concentrated on developing a European common commercial policy. The 
countries within the community, aside from Belgium, had no links to the former 
colonies in the region and therefore little interest was taken in the region. Changes 
began to take place with the joining of the UK, which still had close colonial ties with 
the West Indies, and were further reinforced when in 1986, Portugal and Spain became 
members of the European Economic Community (EEC), bringing attention back to 
Latin America. According to the same author, the ensuing decade between the 1980s 
and 1990s marked a golden era for EU relations with the region mainly due to European 
interest in bringing peace and stability to conflict zones, as well as its interest in 
exporting the European integration model to the region. Nowadays, the EU is an 
important partner both economically and politically to Latin America. It is the leading 
donor, one of the main foreign investors and an important trading partner for the region 
(OECD, 2014). Relations have intensified and been shaped to a large extent by political 
dialogue taking place at regular high-level summits and target not only bilateral 
relations but also work through a series of regional and sub-regional partnerships, 
reflecting the EU’s recognition of the region’s heterogeneity. Currently the EU boasts a 
wide range of agreements with individual countries as well as country groupings. 
Perhaps most significant for the EU’s relations with the region as a whole are the 
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bioregional Rio Summit which has taken place every two years since 1999, and CELAC 
which is a regional mechanism for political dialogue and cooperation that for the first 
time groups together all 33 countries (EC, 2013). 
 
4.2.3 EU Instruments for Latin America: from ODA to blended finance? 
According to the OECD Statistics Database (OECD, 2017c), during the period 
1993 to 2015, the EU disbursed approximately $5.2 billion in bilateral ODA to Latin 
America. The region’s development cooperation has been governed by DCI since 2007, 
with funds organised into regional, bilateral and thematic programmes.  
As outlined earlier, the EU defines policy priorities and the budgets foreseen for the 
achievement of results in its MFFs. The latest 2014-2020 MFF, established in 
accordance with DCI Regulation and based on the EU-CELAC Strategic Partnership 
and Action Plan, committed an overall allocation for the Regional Programme for Latin 
America, of €925 million (EEAS & EC, 2014) as well as a total of approximately 1.2 
billion under bilateral agreements with individual countries (EC, 2017b). 
As mentioned in the previous section, the Agenda for change represents a shift in 
paradigm, which has reflected itself in some of the instruments and implementation 
methods established by the 2014-2020 MFF, directly affecting the EU-Latin America 
development cooperation relationship. Among these are the DCI, the Partnership 
Instrument and the EU Blending Facilities: 
 The Development Cooperation Instrument now functions according to the notion 
of differentiation, with the aim being to concentrate more aid in the countries most 
in need. This criteria has resulted in the “graduation” of upper-middle income 
countries (UMICs), meaning that they are no longer eligible for assistance under the 
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bilateral geographic component of the DCI, but remain eligible under the DCI’s 
thematic and regional programmes. They will now receive bilateral cooperation 
under the partnership Instrument. This shift in focus resulted in the discontinuation, 
since 2014, of bilateral aid to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. Countries that continue to be eligible for bilateral aid 
include 13 OCTs and 6 Latin American countries. Colombia, Ecuador and Peru will 
have bilateral cooperation discontinued at the end of this year (EC, 2017b). 
Relations between the EU and MICs will adopt a cooperation and mutual-interests 
approach and these countries will be eligible for project funding under the PI.  
 The Partnership Instrument represents the main innovative instrument in the 
external aid package (EC, 2013), and has the overall objective of furthering EU 
interests through the external dimension of its internal policies. “It will also address 
specific aspects of the EU’s economic diplomacy with a view to improving access to 
third country markets by boosting trade, investment and business opportunities for 
European companies” (EC, 2017c). The instrument will aim to further public 
diplomacy relations with those countries, which are having a greater role in the 
world economy and those, which due to recent GDP growth rates, are no longer 
eligible to receive bilateral cooperation (differentiation principle described above). 
In practice, this instrument creates forums for dialogues between the EU and a 
recipient country or region on a variety of issues within various sectors, both in 
order to promote the EU’s values and to create more reciprocal and mutually 
beneficial partnerships with these countries. Countries having “graduated” from 
bilateral cooperation will rely to a large extent on this instrument to capture EU 
funding.  
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 The EU Blending facilities combine EU grants or loans with public and private 
equity, the objective being to reduce risk with the grant element and as a result 
attract more financing for large-scale investments in EU partner countries. EU 
blending operations are implemented through regionally or thematically focused 
financial instruments and are organised into Blending Frameworks according to the 
financing instrument that is providing the funding. For the Latin America, the DCI 
Blending Framework includes the The Latin American Investment Facility 
(LAIF) which between 2009 and 2016 has been allocated a budget of €323 million, 
resulting in a combined investment cost of over €8 billion (Hultquist, 2015). This 
mechanism supports the new vision, present in the Agenda for Change and the 
NECD, of an EU external cooperation focused on supporting inclusive growth and 
job creation, as well as the idea of collaborating further with the private sector in 
order to achieve greater development results. The benefits that the European 
Commission claims are associated with this innovative financing mechanism 
includes, leveraging of ever-shrinking aid budgets, support to policy reforms, 
increasing financing in a sustainable and affordable way, socio-economic 
development promoted through investment in public service and infrastructure; and 
lower risk of investing in new markets and sectors (EC, 2017d).  
These changes that have taken place in the EU’s development cooperation signal 
an evolving approach. The latter is based on the new world context on two fronts: 
European countries have been grappling with the economic crisis and the resulting 
pressure to show development results achieved back home, as well as the security issues 
(migration, climate change etc.) that have developed in their own neighbourhood. On 
the other hand, several “emerging” economies are “graduating” out of their status as 
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recipient countries representing both a challenge and an opportunity for the European 
Union in its development policy (EC, 2017e). 
 
4.3 China and EU in Latin America: Wrapping up 
European Union development cooperation in Latin America represents a 
significantly different model to the Chinese one, which fits in with the SSC 
characteristics listed earlier on. It is based on a longer track record in the region, which 
has resulted in a more stable, comprehensive and adapted strategy taking into account 
the region’s heterogeneity and its main priorities in the field of development 
cooperation. Nevertheless, the most recent communication and policy papers have 
introduced a noticeably new policy direction as a response to the current world context. 
The next section will consider the Chinese and European Union development 
cooperation models side-by-side and - to the extent that is possible with two such 
different approaches - will discuss what the two sides can learn from each other and 
pave the way towards a new Beyond Aid paradigm. 
 
V. Analysis: Comparing EU and Chinese models of Development 
Cooperation 
 
The following analysis will discuss the two development models described thus far, 
dividing into four main themes which provide for interesting points of comparison in 
terms of development cooperation finance practices: Country and sector focus, political 
and economic conditionalities, blending of private and public funds; and environmental 
regulation. These four categories incorporate analyses of the SSC characteristics 
established earlier on. The aim will be to gain some insight as to whether the initial 
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argument that we are seeing a “Southernisation” of financing practices, can be verified 
in the case of China and the European Union in Latin America. 
 
5.1 Country and Sector Focus 
Figure 2 shows EU aid disbursements and Chinese loan disbursements (from the 
CDB and Chinese ExIm Bank) to Latin American countries for the period 2005-2016. 
Chinese aid disbursements are not published according to DAC principles but as 
mentioned previously the estimates show that the amounts are very low compared to 
overall EU ones, and for this reason loans by the two state-owned policy banks have 
been used as a point of comparison. The data shows that countries in which EU and 
Chinese development financing intersect are Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Of these countries, five have “graduated” from 
bilateral cooperation with the EU and therefore receive aid only through geographic and 
thematic instruments. The NECD strongly emphasizes the fact that funds should be 
diverted from Middle Income Countries (MICs) to those that need it the most. A new 
path is to be taken whereby more developed economies are seen not as recipients but as 
partners in the successful implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. The 
sectors outlined as priorities are youth, gender equality, mobility and migration, 
sustainable energy and climate change, investment and trade, good governance, 
democracy and the rule of law and human rights. As seen in the section on Chinese 
development cooperation, loans are mainly directed towards EMITH sectors in order to 
secure natural resources, and their geographic concentration reflects this preference. It 
would seem that the EU is slowly pulling funding from Latin America, recognizing that 
many of the economies no longer need its support, and China has been quickly filling 
this void over the past less than a decade. This signals a positive trend in terms of 
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development cooperation results for the continent but negative effects may arise from 
the fact that the EU is reducing funds to the social sectors in MICs, in which China is 
not that interested in intervening. The focus is shifting towards a partnership based on 
trade and commercial activities. “Graduated” countries continue to be eligible for 
funding via blending facilities (LAIF), but the targeted sectors will mainly be large 
infrastructure projects. This said, the NECD (EC, 2017e) does point out that special 
attention will be paid to the more specific challenges faced by the MICs, many of which 
“still have high numbers of people living in poverty within their borders and often have 
very high levels of inequality and social exclusion”.  
 
5.2 Political and Economic Conditionalities 
The EU uses several types of political and economic conditionalities in its aid 
disbursements in order to promote democracy, good governance and sustainable 
development. These conditions can take the forms of negative measures like sanctions 
or positive ones whereby recipients agree to carry out reforms within their public 
administrations. The latter approach depends on the achievement of agreed results in 
order for the receipt of further funds. The EU use of conditionalities for aid 
disbursements reflects its vision that “good governance, democracy and the rule of law 
are vital for sustainable development” (EC, 2017e). In addition to this, the recent 
context of economic crisis has put increasing pressure on the EU and other donor 
countries to be able to show that money spent on aid is having the desired results, and 
that they are not supporting autocratic and/or corrupt governments. The underlying aim 
has been to give less, and achieve more.  
China on the other hand, abides by the principle of non-interference in domestic 
affairs, and has shown little regard for governance issues within countries as well as a 
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lack of a results-based approach. In fact, as mentioned previously, it has concentrated 
some of its biggest loans specifically in countries during periods where they had 
restricted access to international lending (such as Argentina, Ecuador, Venezuela), 
filling the void left by Western finance institutions. All this said, China does impose an 
important political conditionality: countries must adhere to the “one China principle” in 
order to be eligible for aid and loan disbursements. Additionally, Chinese aid is openly 
“tied” with loans often being attached to conditions relating to the use of Chinese labour 
and resources, and with the use of oil-backed loans in order to lower the risk associated 
with its investments (Gallagher, Irwin & Koleski, 2012). The notion that development 
cooperation is undergoing a “Southernisation” would presume that due to Chinese 
financing, EU institutions have been losing their leverage over countries, which have 
been reluctant to apply political and economic conditionalities. As a result, we should in 
fact be seeing a move towards a relaxing of conditions imposed. In the case of 
conditionalities, this does not seem to be the case – in fact as shown in the Agenda for 
Change and the NECD, the European Union has been signalling a move toward stricter 
governance conditions. The need to lower the risk of investments, in the form of grants 
and loans, made to recipient countries has become more important as a result of the 
increasing need to achieve “value for money” and results. China would seem to be 
moving in a similar direction as growth has been slowing down and domestic tensions 
have been rising. In addition to this, recent dealings with countries like Venezuela have 
sounded the warning bells as the messy political and economic situation has caused the 
country to fall back on its oil shipments as payment for Chinese loans. In the case of 
conditionalities, it would seem that there is not a “Southernisation” and that in fact it is 
more likely that China will slowly start to find ways to protect its investments. Whether 
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this will be done through EU-like conditionalities is unclear; China might merely 
achieve these results through further tying of aid.  
 
5.3 Blending of private and public funds 
As outlined earlier on, Chinese aid financing is in many cases difficult to separate 
from commercial flows due to the set up of the banking system and in particular the role 
of its policy banks. This allows China to leverage public funds for investment in large-
scale infrastructure projects with high visibility. According to Mawdsley (2016), the 
blending of grants, concessional loans and technical assistance, with market based loans 
and export credits in support of projects, has been rather criticized. However, she also 
notes that the “pendulum may in fact be swinging in their direction, including among 
the DAC and other ‘traditional’ donors”. This does seem to be the case for the EU, 
though funding channeled through the Blending facilities remains limited for the period 
2014-2020, EU communication and policy papers strongly emphasize a move towards a 
more aggressive approach in blending. Both the Agenda for Change and the NECD 
highlight the importance of “blending grants and loans, as a way to leverage additional 
private finance …(as)… another important means to implement the 2030 agenda.” (EC, 
2017e). This said, figure 3 shows EU grant allocations per investment facility for 
roughly the period from 2007-2016. When analyzing the figures by region, it is clear 
that the EU’s surrounding neighborhood (including Northern African, Middle Eastern 
and Western Balkan countries) is prioritized with an allocation of €2.83 Billion. In 
second place comes (Sub-Saharan) Africa with €654 million, Latin America and 
Caribbean region comes next with €388.6 million, and finally Asia received an 
allocation of €218 million over the period 2008-2016. The recent European Investment 
Plan proposed by the EC in 2016 signals a further reinforcement of these trends in terms 
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of funding priorities. It is an ambitious plan with the aim of encouraging further 
investment in Africa and the EU neighborhood region, and will count on a €4.1 billion 
allocation, expected to leverage €44 billion by 2020. It would seem that although the 
EU is moving further towards the Chinese in terms of blending of private and public 
funds, Latin America is not positioned to be one of the main beneficiaries of this trend 
for the moment. This diversion in priorities might be momentary as EU tackles issues 
closer to home.  
 
5.4 Environmental regulation 
The bulk of Chinese loans from the CDB and ExIm bank have gone to Energy and 
Infrastructure projects. These are areas with higher social and environmental risks, 
resulting in an increasingly negative image for China both within recipient countries 
and internationally. This is further reinforced by the fact that it does not adhere to 
international standards, instead opting to follow recipient country regulations. On the 
other hand, as mentioned previously, the ‘traditional’ donors including the EU have put 
in place a set of what some might view as restrictive and cumbersome environmental 
standards which in many cases encourages countries to look elsewhere for funding in 
order to carry out large scale infrastructure projects rapidly. 
The EU has been making efforts to improve the speed of disbursements and this 
idea is strongly reflected in the NECD. The EC is currently increasing the amount of 
funding and size of projects that are eligible for implementation through framework 
contracts - until recently this fast-tracked procurements procedure was only applicable 
to small contracts under €300,000 but as from next year will be applicable to projects up 
to €999,999. Additionally, one of the positive effects associated with blending refers to 
non-financial leverage, which includes faster project starts, for larger-scale projects 
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(EC, 2017d). On the other hand, several independent evaluations carried out on 
Blending operations warn against prioritizing speed over transparency, proper 
monitoring and evaluation frameworks and environmental assessments. China has 
already been making strides in this direction with the CDB and ExIm Bank adopting 
various regulation, guidelines and memoranda with other IFIs, although it is difficult to 
measure to what extent these guidelines are respected and put into practice (Gallagher, 
Irwin and Koleski, 2012). Additionally, the two policy banks are relatively new to the 
development lending industry and “in comparison with the World bank in the 1980s, the 
CDB and China Ex-Im Bank are ahead of history” (ibid). The tendency will most 
probably be for China to move further towards Western donor standards not only to 
improve their image but also to protect their investments.  
 
VI. Conclusion: Some thoughts on the Future of Development 
cooperation 
 
It would seem that the answer to the initial question “Is development cooperation 
financing undergoing a “Southernisation”?” needs a more nuanced response than first 
expected, when looking at the specific case of the EU and China in Latin America. With 
regards to the SSDC characteristics summarised at the end of Chapter III, the analysis 
has allowed for the following tentative conclusions to be made: 
1. Respect for sovereignty; no conditionalities and non-Interference in domestic affairs: 
The EU is opting to impose stricter conditionalities as part of its focus on a “value for 
money” approach, whilst China is further tying aid in order to protect its interests which 
can be negatively affected by recipient country domestic context.  
2. Importance of the mutual benefit approach: China openly adheres to the “win-win” 
model of development cooperation and the EU would seem to be moving further in this 
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direction, again due to a more focused approach whereby funding is leveraged through 
blending (although Latin America is not currently the priority, and this mechanism is 
still in its early days), and with the creation of partnerships with the region’s MICs. 
3. Importance of loans vis-à-vis other forms of financing: China’s loans are often used 
together with grants in order to carry out development cooperation, blurring the line 
between commercial and development interests. The EU is focusing more on leveraging 
funds through Blending facilities, and there is debate among member states concerning 
the potential broadening of the ODA definition to include some of the BOFs. 
4. Bias towards infrastructure & production projects: China clearly prioritises the EMITH 
sectors. The EU on the other hand still mainly concentrates on social sectors although 
both the Blending and Partnership Instruments are allowing for a focus on larger energy 
and infrastructure projects as well as more commercially based partnerships. 
5. Speedier negotiation, agreement of contracts and project undertaking: China is coming 
under greater pressure to adhere to stricter environmental standards, which will 
probably create more bureaucratic procurement processes. The EU on the other hand is 
trying to move away from the cumbersome and lengthy processes incurred by strict 
environmental regulation (Blending, Framework Contracts etc.) 
It is clear that the two models have been very different, with China adopting a 
mutual interests-driven approach with a focus on natural resources, while the EU has for 
decades prioritised social sectors and developed a very comprehensive framework 
through which it transparently and consistently, carries out development cooperation. 
This said, the rise of China and other fast-growing middle-income economies has 
clearly had a destabilising effect on the traditional ODA approach, which was already 
under intense scrutiny due to the poor results achieved with regards to the MDGs.  The 
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effects have included a visibly “Southernised” EU cooperation not only as a result of 
these new actors, but recently due to the events taking place within its neighbourhood. 
However, China’s approach has also undergone major changes, as it learns from 
experience and as its domestic growth slows down. It would seem that the models are 
indeed merging, but whether it is a bias towards the Chinese model, is unclear. In any 
case, Latin America would seem to be facing a challenging period as the EU 
concentrates its attentions elsewhere and fundamentally changes its approach to the 
major economic powers of the region, leaving behind a funding gap in the social sectors 
of these countries. Until it is clear that China will adopt a more “responsible” approach 
towards development financing, it will be up to local policy makers to strengthen 
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ANNEX I 
 
Figure 1. EU Development Finance Geographic and Thematic Instruments (descriptions and allocated budgets) 
 
Instrument name Budget allocation 
MFF (2014-2020) 
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance II (IPA II): supports countries aiming to join the EU, in the implementation 
of comprehensive reform strategies needed to prepare for future membership (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo

, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). 
€11.7 billion 
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI): Provides funding to countries covered by the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, in order to strengthen relations with non-EU neighbouring countries (Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, the Republic of Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and 
Ukraine). 
€15. 4 billion 
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI): Covers all the developing countries (except those eligible for the IPA). 
Its geographic programmes cover developing countries in Asia, Central Asia, Middle East, Latin America, and South 
Africa. Thematic programmes are divided into two categories: 1. Global Public Goods and Challenges, 2. Civil society 
organisations and local authorities. 
€19.7 billion 
Instrument for Greenland (IfG): Aims to assist Greenland in diversifying its economy, for an increased focus on 
policy dialogue, recognising its geostrategic importance. 
€ 217 million 
Partnership Instrument (PI): The aim of this thematic instrument is to advance and promote EU interests by 
supporting the external dimension of EU internal policies. Supports public diplomacy, people to people contacts, 
academic cooperation and outreach activities in order to promote the EU’s values and interests. 
€ 955 million 
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IfSP): key instrument used to respond to crises and create a safe and 
stable environment. 
€ 2,3 billion 
European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights (EIDHR): The objective of this instrument is to increase the 
EU’s capacity to respond to human rights emergencies and support human rights protection mechanisms, through 
increased support to civil societies. 
€ 1,3 billion 
Instrument for Nuclear Safety and Cooperation (INSC): Applicable to all third countries with preference given to 
accession and neighbouring countries (IPA and ENI), and responds to the global challenges and the need for EU action 
in the field of nuclear safety, radiation protection and nuclear safeguards. 
€ 225 million 
European Development Fund (EDF): Covers cooperation with African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACPs) and 
Overseas Countries and Territories. Unlike previous 8 instruments, remains outside of the EU budget. 
€ 30.5 billion 
Source: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/funding-instruments-programming/funding-instruments_en 
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ANNEX II 





Total EU aid disbursements 
2005-2016 
Total CDB and ChExIm Loans 2005-
2016 
Argentina 198 M 15.3 B 
Belize 117 M 
 Bolivia 659 M 3.5 B 
Brazil 906 M 36.8 B 
Chile 256 M 
 Colombia 612 M 
 Costa Rica 82 M 395 M 
Ecuador 551 M 17.4 B 
El Salvador 347 M 
 Guatemala 371 M 
 Guyana 330 M 
 Mexico 172 M 1 B 
Nicaragua 595 M 
 Panama MINUS 179 M 
 Paraguay 184 M 
 Peru 518 M 50 M 
Uruguay 96  M 
 Venezuela 109 M 62.2 B 
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ANNEX III 



























Source: EC, 2017c and Hultquist, 2015 
NIF (2008-2015) 
EU grant amount: €1,432 Billion 
Total est. investments: €13,83 Billion 
 
LAIF (2009-2016) 
EU grant amount: €305 Million 
Total est. investments: €8 Billion 
 CIF (2010-2016) 
EU grant amount: €83.6 Million 
Total est. investments: €965 Million 
 
EU-AITF (2007-2015) 
EU grant amount: €654.9 Million 
Total est. investments: €9.2 Billion 
 
WBIF (2008-2016) 
EU grant amount: €1.4 Billion 
Total est. investments: €15.3 Billion 
 
AIF (2010-2015) 
EU grant amount: €89 Million 
Total est. investments: €2.63 Billion 
 
IFP (2012-2014) 
EU grant amount: €10 Million 
 
IFCA (2010-2015) 
EU grant amount: €119 Million 
Total est. investments: €830 Million 
 
